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 Energy security should be conceptualized as an instance of security in general.
 4As of energy security and related approaches do not address security questions.
 We deﬁne energy security as low vulnerability of vital energy systems (VES).
 VES support critical social functions and can be drawn sectorally or geographically.
 Vulnerability is a combination of exposure to risks and resilience capacities.
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a b s t r a c t
Energy security studies have expanded from their classic beginnings following the 1970s oil crises to
encompass various energy sectors and increasingly diverse issues. This viewpoint contributes to the
re-examination of the meaning of energy security that has accompanied this expansion. Our starting
point is that energy security is an instance of security in general and thus any concept of it should
address three questions: “Security for whom?”, “Security for which values?” and “Security from what
threats?” We examine an inﬂuential approach – the ‘four As of energy security’ (availability, accessibility,
affordability, and acceptability) and related literature of energy security – to show it does not address
these questions. We subsequently summarize recent insights which propose a different concept of
energy security as ‘low vulnerability of vital energy systems’. This approach opens the road for detailed
exploration of vulnerabilities as a combination of exposure to risks and resilience and of the links
between vital energy systems and critical social functions. The examination of energy security framed by
this concept involves several scientiﬁc disciplines and provides a useful platform for scholarly analysis
and policy learning.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
As a policy problem, energy security emerged in the early 20th
century in connection with supplying oil for armies (Yergin, 1991).
Academic reﬂections on energy security date back to the 1960s
(e.g. Lubell, 1961) and came of age with the oil crises of the 1970s.
In the late 1980s and 90s, the academic interest in energy security
declined following the stabilization of oil prices and the receding
threat of political embargoes. It re-emerged in the 2000s driven by
the rising demand in Asia, disruptions of gas supplies in Europe,
and the pressure to de-carbonize energy systems (Yergin, 2006;
Hughes and Lipscy, 2013; Hancock and Vivoda, 2014).
However, there is an important difference between contem-
porary and ‘classic’ energy security studies. In the 1970s and 80s,
energy security meant stable supply of cheap oil under threats of
embargoes and price manipulations by exporters (Colglazier and
Deese, 1983; Yergin, 1988). In contrast, contemporary energy
security challenges extend beyond oil supplies and encompass a
wider range of issues (Yergin, 2006). Moreover, energy security is
now closely entangled with other energy policy problems such as
providing equitable access to modern energy and mitigating
climate change (Goldthau, 2011). Thus the concept of energy
security implicit in the classic studies has become a subject of
intense re-examination.
Energy Policy has published over a dozen articles on the concept
of energy security over the past ﬁve years. Many of these publica-
tions mentioned the “four As of energy security” (availability,
accessibility, affordability and acceptability) introduced by the Asia
Paciﬁc Energy Research Centre (APERC, 2007). However, there has
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been no academic reﬂection on this approach except by Jewell
et al. (2014) who noted its remarkable similarity to the “5As”
of access to health care (availability, accessibility, accommodation,
affordability and acceptability) proposed in 1981 by Penchansky
and Thomas (1981). It is thus time to ask: have the four As helped
to conceptualize the ‘new’ energy security and if not why and
what alternative approaches can be used?
In this paper we seek to answer these questions. Section 2
explains the rationale and the principles for conceptualizing
energy security. Section 3 describes the history and the inﬂuence
of the four As. Section 4 examines the four As in light of key
security questions. Section 5 describes alternative approaches and
Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2. Why and how to conceptualize energy security?
It is a common observation that energy security means differ-
ent things in different situations and to different people. There are
natural explanations for this variation. First, energy systems vary
from one place to another which gives rise to different energy
security problems. Secondly, the ‘energy security’ term is some-
times extended to other energy policy issues ranging from energy
poverty to climate change. Does this variety demonstrate “imprac-
ticality of seeking a common deﬁnition of energy security”
(Chester, 2009, 893)?
We do not think so. Indeed, the presence of different meanings
of energy security do not necessarily mean the existence of
different concepts of energy security. In some cases it may instead
mean that one and the same concept ﬁnds different expressions
under different conditions. This is what largely explains variations
in energy security priorities and policies between different coun-
tries. Such differences stress rather than negate the need for
conceptual clarity, which can support rational policy analysis,
international comparison and learning. Energy security in this
respect is not much different from ‘justice’ or ‘minority rights’
which despite their different meanings are nevertheless subject to
vigorous conceptual debates and policy comparisons.
Different interpretations of energy security may also result
from the usage of the term by those who seek to increase the
priority of other policy agendas by calling them a matter of
‘[energy] security’. Such attempts highlight the need to disentan-
gle the debate about the concept of energy security from norma-
tive and empirical discussions about climate change mitigat-
ion, energy poverty alleviation, and other energy policy agendas,
however legitimate they may be.1
A good social science concept should not aim to eliminate
different meanings of a contested term but rather to “reduc[e] the
limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies …[by enhancing] …
the clarity and precision of these meanings as well as their ability
to function in hypotheses and theories with explanatory and
predictive force” (Hempel, 1964, 12). Thus a better energy security
concept is needed not only to enable rational policy analysis and
learning by separating energy security from other policy problems,
but also to provide a shared language, without which scholars
cannot communicate with each other or with policy-makers.
A good starting point in conceptualizing energy security is the
observation in Baldwin's seminal article The concept of security that
“economic security, environmental security, identity security,
social security, and military security are different forms of security,
not fundamentally different concepts” (Baldwin, 1997, 23). This
logically applies to energy security as well, meaning that a valid
concept of energy security should be based on a concept of
security in general.
Baldwin deﬁnes security as a “low probability of damage to
acquired values”, building on a half-century tradition of security
studies starting with Wolfers (1952).2 He then goes on to argue
that this general deﬁnition should be adopted to speciﬁc situations
and that such ‘closer speciﬁcations of security’ should answer at
least the following questions3:
 Security for whom?
 Security for which values?
 From what threats?
These questions have rarely been explicitly asked in the energy
security literature, though similar questions (What to protect?
Fromwhich risks? and By which means?) are brieﬂy mentioned by
von Hippel (2011) and used by Leung et al. (2014) to structure
their analysis of securitization of energy in China. In the next
sections we discuss to which extent the four As and their
derivatives contribute to a ‘closer speciﬁcation of energy security’
by engaging with these key questions.
3. History of the four As and related thinking
The four As of energy security (availability, affordability, acces-
sibility and acceptability) are a frequent starting point of con-
temporary energy security studies. Two of the four As – availability
and affordability – prominently featured already in the classic
energy security studies (Deese, 1979; Yergin, 1988) and still remain
at heart of the International Energy Agency's mainstream deﬁni-
tion deﬁnition of energy security “as the uninterrupted availability
of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA, 2014)4. The other
two As – accessibility and acceptability – have a more complex
history. Both were among the global energy goals proclaimed by
the World Energy Council5 in its Millennium Declaration (WEC,
2000) but were not connected to energy security until the 2007
APERC report.
It is likely that these terms bled over to the ﬁeld of energy and
later energy security from other ﬁelds. The full “A-framework” is
ﬁrst mentioned in a 1981 article addressing the ‘5As of health care
access’ (Penchansky and Thomas, 1981). This paper (cited almost
500 times in Scopus and over 1000 times in Google Scholar) was
inﬂuential beyond its original scope. In particular, similar frame-
works were used by the UN, with respect to human rights,
education, and food (e.g. Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, 2000; UNESCO Secretariat, 2002).
In 2007, APERC used the A-framework, merging the classic
‘availability’ and ‘affordability’ with ‘acceptability’ and ‘accessibil-
ity’ to structure their report on energy security in Asia. The report
did not justify the use of the four As by reference to prior
literature, empirical observations or logical reasoning. Neither
did it laid a claim that the four As constitute a generic concept
1 As Baldwin argues, one of the problems with “cloaking normative and
empirical debate in conceptual rhetoric exaggerates the conceptual differences
between proponents of various security policies and impedes scholarly commu-
nication” (Baldwin, 1997, 5).
2 A classic deﬁnition of energy security by Daniel Yergin echoes this approach
by referring to energy security “assur[ing] adequate, reliable supplies of energy at
reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and
objectives” (Yergin, 1988, 111).
3 Baldwin suggests four more questions: “How much security?”, “At what
costs?”, “By what means?” and “In what time period?” but contends that it may not
be necessary to answer all of these if only more general speciﬁcations of security
are sought.
4 A 2010 version of the IEA's deﬁnition cited by Hughes (2012) included a
clause “while respecting environmental concerns”.
5 ‘Accessibility’ in this context meant access to (modern) energy in developing
countries and included affordability.
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or essential characteristics of energy security. Nevertheless, the
mnemonic of the four As was taken up by the energy security
literature. Kruyt et al. (2009) grouped their indicators of energy
security by the four As, which they called ‘a classiﬁcation scheme’
(but did not explain whether it is a classiﬁcation of values, threats
or something else). Chester (2009) mentioned the APERC report in
her inﬂuential article addressing four ‘dimensions’ of energy
security (availability, adequacy, affordability, and sustainability),
similar, but not identical, to the four As. She argued that the
concept of energy security was ‘slippery’ (i.e. impractical to
universally deﬁne or conceptualize) and ‘multi-dimensional’.
Some scholars interpreted this argument as both a discourage-
ment to search for a rigorous concept of energy security and as
green light to propose their own ‘multi-dimensional’ deﬁnitions.
Subsequently many studies have ‘conceptualized’ energy security
by liberally adding or modifying dimensions to the four As, thus
making Chester's argument a self-fulﬁlling prophecy: the concept
of energy security has indeed become both ‘slippery’ and ‘multi-
dimensional’.6
For example, Hughes’ (2012) ‘generic framework for the
description and analysis of energy security’ contains three indica-
tors: availability, affordability and acceptability.7 The ‘new com-
prehensive energy security paradigm’ by von Hippel et al. (2011)
contains six dimensions and Vivoda (2010) adds ﬁve more.
Sovacool (2011) proposed 20 dimensions of energy security
including availability and affordability. Winzer's (2012) concep-
tualization stands apart in that it reﬂectively mentions but does
not directly uses the four As (‘availability’ and ‘accessibility’ are
identiﬁed with ‘natural’ and ‘human’ sources of risks and ‘afford-
ability’ and ‘acceptability’ with economic and environmental
impacts of energy).
4. Analysis of the four As
The following three sub-sections discuss whether the four As
and related literature deal with the three fundamental security
questions: Security for whom? Security for which values? and
Security from what threats?
4.1. Security for whom?
Baldwin concurs with another prominent security scholar,
Barry Buzan, that a concept of security that fails to ask Security
for whom? “makes little sense” (Baldwin, 1997, 13). In Buzan's
terminology, asking this question means pointing to the ‘referent
object’ of security (typically the state but can also be other
entities) (Buzan et al., 1998). The four As do not answer or even
ask Security for whom?, most likely because this question is not
explicitly present in either classic energy security or access to
health care studies.
Indeed, in the classic energy security studies the referent
objects were implicitly clear: oil-importing industrial nations.
Likewise, ‘referent objects’ of the access to health care – clients
of health services – are self-obvious. This implicit clarity allowed
measurement and management of all of the ‘As’, for example,
accessibility was the time it takes for the client to reach a health
care facility, affordability was the relationship between the client's
income and the cost of health service, and acceptability meant
patient comfort with, for example the physical attributes of
doctors’ ofﬁces and neighborhoods.
For today's energy security, the question 'For whom?' may be
more complicated than in case of both access to health care and
energy security in the 1970s. The scope of contemporary energy
security studies goes beyond OECD oil importers to include
nations of all levels of development that extract, import, export
and use a variety of energy sources and carriers. Moreover, such
studies also address perspectives on energy security of non-state
actors ranging from global production networks (Bridge, 2008) to
individual regions, utilities and consumers. This opens pandora's
box of possible interpretations, particularly of affordability and
acceptability, because it is not clear for whom energy should be
affordable or acceptable. For example, APERC (2007) uses afford-
ability to mean proﬁtability of energy investments, whereas Kruyt
et al. (2009) and Hughes (2012) interpret it as low energy prices
for consumers. Sharifuddin (2013) argues that affordability also
relates to government accounts in terms of subsidy levels and
import/export balance. Which of these interpretations of afford-
ability is relevant to energy security in a particular situation
depends on how the question ‘security for whom?’ is answered
(Table 1).
Identifying a valid referent object is equally important for
clarifying acceptability. The APERC report as well as its main
interpretations – Kruyt et al. (2009), Chester (2009) (who replaces
it with ‘sustainability’), Hughes (2012) and Winzer (2012) – all
equate acceptability with environmental impacts of energy sys-
tems. However, what is environmentally acceptable varies widely
among different actors: local population, environmental NGOs,
industries, and nation states. Therefore without deﬁning a referent
object the term ‘[environmental] acceptability’ loses any speciﬁc
meaning.
Since referent objects of energy security were not addressed in
the four As, the subsequent literature used diverse, fragmented
and often contradictory approaches to this problem. Some studies
(e.g. Kruyt et al., 2009; Hughes, 2012; Winzer, 2012) did not
explicitly deﬁne referent objects. In contrast, Chester (2009) used
the fact that the meaning of energy security depends on the
referent object as the central argument for her thesis that the
energy security concept cannot be universally deﬁned. Yet others
attempted to develop a view of energy security which would
incorporate viewpoints of different referent objects by summing
them up through surveys and interviews (e.g. Sovacool and
Mukherjee, 2011). In our view this is not a robust method because
it blurs rather than clariﬁes the distinct priorities of different
actors (Cherp, 2012).
4.2. Security for which values?
The second fundamental security question is Security for which
values?. The four As are characteristics of energy systems, not
human values. Of course, they are linked to political, economic,
social and other priorities. However, the literature inspired by the
four As does not analyze these links. This is more than merely a
formal omission because failing to identify protected values and
their connections with energy means failing to answer a central
concrete policy question: “which energy security systems to
protect?”. This is a key issue for moving energy security science
beyond last century's insights. The classic energy security studies
proceeded from the strong, self-evident and implicit connection
between national values such as political independence and
territorial integrity and a particular energy system: oil supplies
(see e.g. Sagan (1988) on pre-war Japan, Lubell (1961) on Western
Europe in the 1960s, and Cheon and Urpelainen (2014) on OECD
countries in the last quarter of the 20th century). In contrast,
6 In fairness, to Chester, these references focused on one of her messages and
ignored the others, such as drawing attention to several ‘aspects’ of energy security
(including risks, temporal aspects, variation from one energy ‘market’ to another,
etc.) and her call for a robust debate on the meaning of energy security based on
transparent assumptions.
7 He also used concepts from energy systems analysis as we mention in Section 5.1.
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contemporary energy security extends beyond oil to other energy
sectors (Yergin, 2006) and in addition to traditional geopolitical
values (Kuzemko, 2013) is also connected to economic welfare
(Bohi and Toman, 1996; Helm, 2002) as well as to internal political
and social stability (Cherp et al., 2012).
Thus, a central question for contemporary energy security
studies is to identify and explore connections between energy
systems and important social values. Protecting values of different
nations means protecting distinct energy systems of those nations,
not ‘energy in general’. This implies tailored metrics of and policies
for enhancing energy security. The four As are not suited for
designing such metrics or informing such policies because they are
unclear about the values to protect, the energy systems to which
they apply, and the links between the two.
4.3. From what threats?
The four As are also not speciﬁc with respect to threats to
energy security. Policies on public services (including energy) are
concerned with either attaining desired standards (e.g. extending
energy or health care access to new areas or groups) or maintain-
ing these standards by the most effective means (e.g. unbundling
electricity generation and transmission to increase competitive-
ness). In contrast, energy security policies are concerned with
already attained standards. This difference echoes Baldwin's dis-
tinction between 'acquiring new values' (which not related to
security) and 'protecting existing values' (which is at the heart of
security). Thus, energy security concerns are largely shaped by
experiences of disruptions and perceptions of risks. For example,
classic energy security studies emerged not as a result of growth
and change in energy systems, but as a result of disruptions to
already existing systems. While analysis of disruptions has always
been central to energy security studies (cf. the term “uninter-
rupted” in the IEA's 2014 deﬁnition and 'reliable' in Yergin's 1988
deﬁnition), Amory and Hunter Lovin’s Brittle Power Lovins and
Lovins, 1982 and other seminal papers (e.g. Stirling, 2010; Yergin,
2006) expanded the focus from the causes of disruptions to the
ability to respond them, i.e. to energy system resilience.
The concepts of risk and resilience are not embedded in the
four As and receive no systematic treatment in the related
literature. Echoing the classic energy security studies, APERC
(2007) mentions geological (availability), geopolitical (accessibil-
ity) and economic (affordability) threats, but does not mention
resilience or explore other vulnerabilities such as aging infrastruc-
ture, terrorist attacks, natural events, or intermittency of solar and
wind energy (e.g. Farrell et al., 2004; Johansson, 2013; Grave et al.,
2012; Liliestam, 2014). Naturally, a concept of energy security
cannot list all possible risks or vulnerabilities, but it should
provide a framework for identifying, measuring and managing
vulnerabilities.
5. Alternative approaches
This section summarizes some recent conceptual developments
concerning energy security. Most of these insights proceed from
deﬁning energy security as the low vulnerability of vital energy
systems (see e.g. Jewell et al. (2014)). This deﬁnition has three
advantages. First, it connects to Baldwin's (1997) deﬁnition of
security (see Section 2), substituting ‘low probability of damage’
by ‘low vulnerability’ and connecting ‘acquired values’ to ‘vital
energy systems’.8 Second, it is not restricted to speciﬁc sectors,
elements of supply chains, or issues and therefore is ﬂexible
enough to be applicable to historic, contemporary and future
energy systems in diverse contexts. Third, it points to areas where
closer contextual speciﬁcations of energy security can be devel-
oped, namely (a) delineating vital energy systems; (b) exploring
their vulnerabilities; and (c) understanding the political process
which leads to the prioritization of certain energy systems and
vulnerabilities. The following three sections provide more detail
on each of the areas.
5.1. Vital energy systems
The concept of ‘vital energy systems’ addresses a central
security question ‘what to protect?’. Vital energy systems are
those energy systems (energy resources, technologies and uses
linked together by energy ﬂows) that support critical social
functions (‘acquired values’ in security terms). Vital energy sys-
tems can be delineated according to geographic and sectoral
boundaries (Cherp and Jewell, 2013) as shown in Fig. 1. Examples
of vital energy systems include oil supplies to armies (Sagan,
1988), energy infrastructure (Farrell et al., 2004), renewable
energy sources (Grave et al., 2012; Johansson, 2013), energy
‘services’ (Jansen and Seebregts, 2009), energy export revenues
(Nemet and Brandt, 2012; Persson et al., 2007), and biofuel or
hydrogen trade in decarbonized energy systems (Jewell et al.,
2014; Månsson et al., 2014).
Differentiating between energy systems allows the develop-
ment of metrics and assessment processes for both individual
systems and their interaction. Examples of such assessments are
the Suply–Demand Index (Scheepers et al., 2007), the Global
Energy Assessment (Riahi et al., 2012; Cherp et al., 2012;
Hughes, 2012), the IEA's Model of Short-term Energy Security
(MOSES) (Jewell, 2011), and the National Energy Security Assess-
ment of Australia (RET, 2011). In addition to better measurement,
Table 1
Different interpretations of affordability – the importance of asking: ‘Security for whom?’.
Affordability for whom? Energy prices should be…
Households and private consumers Low compared to household incomea,b,c
Industry and businesses Low compared to competitors’ pricesc
Nations Low enough to ensure the energy import bill is small compared to export earningsc
Energy companies and investors High enough to ensure sufﬁcient proﬁtability for energy companies and investorsd
a Kruyt et al. (2009) says that affordability translates to low energy prices but does not specify the consumer group (households or
industry).
b Sharifuddin (2013) deﬁnes affordability relative to government accounts, private consumers and industries.
c Hughes (2012) deﬁnes affordability relative to consumer income.
d APERC (2007) refers to investment cost affordability.
8 This deﬁnition takes Yergin's classic deﬁnition cited in footnote 2 into the
21st century. It includes the concepts of adequacy, reliability and reasonable prices
into a more general concept of ‘low vulnerability’ (which also includes ‘resilience’
and other characteristics of energy systems). It expands the reference to ‘supply’ to
the more general concept of ‘energy systems’ (also including infrastructure,
demand, and end-uses). Finally, it folds Yergins reference to national values and
objectives into the concept of vital energy systems.
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identiﬁcation of vital energy system also allows better targeting of
energy security policies (Jewell, 2014).
5.2. Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities of vital energy systems are combinations of
their exposure to risks and their resilience—Fig. 1 (Cherp and
Jewell, 2013; Jewell, 2011; IEA, 2011). Energy security studies
differentiate between risks of different natures and origins. Most
make a distinction between short-term disruptions called ‘shocks’
and long-term ‘stresses’ (Stirling, 2011; Winzer, 2012).9 The second
common distinction is between physical and economic risks.
Concerning the latter, a useful energy security analysis cuts
through the rhetoric of “affordable”, “reasonable”, “competitive”,
“cost-reﬂective”, or “fair” prices. A good starting point is the
argument that in the context of energy security: “prices are […]
affordable if they stop short of causing severe disruption of normal
social and economic activity” (Deese, 1979, 140). Prices can be
disruptive for different economic actors as discussed in Table 1 and
Section 4.1. Thus using the term ‘affordability’ with respect to
energy security should always answer the question ‘affordability
for whom?’.
Contemporary energy security studies distinguish not only
between the nature of risks, but also between their origins (or
sources as Winzer (2012) puts it). Baldwin (1997) points to a
distinction between risks as threats from other social actors and
forces of nature. These constitute two fundamentally distinct
perspectives (Cherp and Jewell, 2011). One, the ‘sovereignty
perspective’, sees the origin of risks in deliberate actions of foreign
actors. It has its roots in political science and focuses on interests,
power, intentions, and the space for maneuver. Another, the
‘robustness perspective’, sees the origin of risks in natural and
technological phenomena such as resource scarcity, the aging of
infrastructure and natural events. It has its roots in natural science
and engineering and focuses on probabilities, magnitude and
impacts of disruptive events.
The third perspective on energy security, ‘the resilience per-
spective’, sees the origin of risks in largely unpredictable social,
economic and technological factors. It has its roots in ecology,
economics and complex systems analysis. It shifts the emphasis
from risk exposure to the other aspect of vulnerability, resilience.
The resilience factors addressed by science and policy of energy
security range from more straightforward ones (such as spare
production capacities, stockpiling, emergency plans, and diverse
suppliers (Yergin, 2006)) to technologic diversiﬁcation (Stirling,
1994). Two recent articles which explore the resilience perspective
are Stirling (2010) who focuses on the different aspects of diversity
and Gracceva and Zeniewski (2014) who characterize energy
security in terms of what they call ‘systemic properties’ and
Molyneaux et al. (2014) who provide insights on measuring
resilience in energy systems from a range of disciplines.
5.3. Referent objects and securitization
Both vital energy systems and their vulnerabilities are not
only objective phenomena, but also political constructs deﬁned
and prioritized by various social actors. This is where ‘referent
objects’ and the question ‘security for whom?’ become impor-
tant. The energy security literature still has not paid enough
attention to this question, but there are several promising
developments.
A recent policy report from Corner House explores how the
politics of scarcity and consumption inﬂuence for whom energy are
secured in policies (Hildyard et al., 2012). Two other academic
contributions use securitization theory to explain energy security
policies. For example, Leung et al. (2014) show that what is viewed
as ‘vital’ depends not only on characteristics of a particular energy
systems, but also on its historical signiﬁcance and the power of
associated institutional interests. Similarly, Nyman (2014) demon-
strated how the importance of a single energy company for
national energy security in the US was politically constructed to
prevent its acquisition by a Chinese company. The combination of
securitization theory and the concept of vital energy systems
offers promising avenues of future research.
Fig. 1. Energy security is deﬁned as ‘low vulnerability of vital energy systems’. Vital energy systems are energy resources, infrastructure and uses linked together by energy
ﬂows that support critical social functions. They can be delineated by sectoral or geographic boundaries (e.g. ‘the Eurasian gas market’ or ‘the Western US electricity grid’).
Vulnerabilities are combinations of exposure to risks and resilience capacities. The three perspectives on vulnerabilities are rooted in different policy problems and different
scientiﬁc disciplines. Source: Compiled from Cherp and Jewell, 2011, 2013.
9 This also relates to Baldwin's (1997) question of security “on what time
scale?”.
A. Cherp, J. Jewell / Energy Policy 75 (2014) 415–421 419
6. Conclusion
Over the last two decades, the science of energy security has
evolved from classic political economy studies of oil supplies for
industrialized democracies to a ﬁeld addressing a much wider
range of energy sectors and challenges. This evolution has pro-
duced a dizzying variety of fragmented and contradictory inter-
pretations of energy security in scholarly and policy literature. In
our view these growing pains should not discourage a search for a
rigorous conceptualization of energy security to provide a shared
platform and language for scientiﬁc analysis and for rational policy
evaluation and learning.
An inﬂuential scheme of classifying energy security concerns
proposed by APERC in 2007 included availability, accessibility,
affordability and acceptability (‘the four As of energy security’).
The four As have given rise to different interpretations and
modiﬁcations, but have not been critically examined as a concept
of energy security. In this viewpoint we analyze the four As and
the related literature and summarize alternative approaches to
conceptualizing energy security.
We start with observing that energy security is an instance of
security in general and therefore general concepts from security
studies are applicable to energy security. We proceed from Baldwin's
(1997) deﬁnition of security as a ‘low probability of damage to
acquired values’. Through a historic analysis we demonstrate that
the four As are partially rooted in the classic energy security studies of
the 1970s (which coin the notions of availability and affordability) and
partly inspired by the literature on access to health care, where the
other two notions – accessibility and acceptability – were introduced
as early as 1981. Neither these traditions, nor the four As answer or
even pose any of the key security questions: “Security for whom?”,
“Security for which values?” and “Security from what threats?”
We also summarize developments from the emerging science
of energy security.10 Deﬁning energy security as ‘low vulnerability
of vital energy systems’ opens a road towards more detailed
speciﬁcations of (a) vital energy systems; and (b) their vulner-
abilities, composed of exposure to risks and resilience (Fig. 1). Of
course, the concepts of vital energy systems, vulnerabilities, risks
and resilience have different meanings in different contexts and
for different actors. In particular, they reﬂect not only objective
properties of energy stocks, ﬂows, infrastructure, markets and
prices, but also political constructs rooted in institutional interests,
memories and distinct perspectives on the future. This is precisely
why the meaning of energy security will always vary from one
place to another. Does it make sense then, one may wonder, to
replace one set of ‘polysemic’ terms (the four As) with another?
We believe it does. The point of conceptualizing a difﬁcult
political concept is not to eliminate different interpretations but
rather to enable their meaningful analysis, comparison and dialogue.
The proposed conceptualization helps to explain and inform policies
by prompting the right questions for example: which energy systems
are vital? which short- and long-term risks are they exposed to?
what is their resilience? what changes in energy prices would disrupt
normal activities? for whom? Addressing such questions brings
together insights from several scientiﬁc disciplines to advance the
science of energy security, as well as support informed policy
making, better policy analysis and learning.
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